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Abstract— The number of mobile devices connected to the 
Internet is rapidly growing, inducing security issues that cannot 
be prevented by common mechanisms such as HTTPS. Indeed, 
mobile environments require light algorithms that can reduce the 
power-consumption and extend battery life. Moreover, HTTPS 
does not offer fine-grained control over the security properties 
such as integrity, confidentiality or authenticity. This lack of 
flexibility can be problematic for both power-consumption and 
security robustness. To overcome these issues, we have proposed 
in previous works a modular architecture, called LECCSAM, 
based on security components to secure any communication 
protocol by adding the required security properties. In the 
context of HTTP, it provides an alternative version of HTTPS by 
adding the integrity, confidentiality, and authenticity properties 
to HTTP separately or in block (i.e. only one property or any 
combinations of two or more properties), depending on the user 
needs and usage context. In this paper, we propose to extend this 
alternative version of HTTPS with the non-repudiation property. 
Preliminary results of the performance evaluation are 
encouraging.  
Keywords—Security properties; non-repudiation; security 
components; HTTPS; communication protocols. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The rapid growth of mobile market has forced IT actors to 
migrate well-known protocols to the smartphone environment. 
These protocols need to take into account several parameters 
such as power-consumption and resource-hungriness in order 
to fit smartphone's prerequisites. In a traditional computer 
environment, the most common protocols used to access the 
Web is HTTP and its secured version HTTPS. HTTPS offers 
great robustness, but its high power-consumption [1] and lack 
of flexibility [2] do not make it suitable for mobile usage. 
Indeed, HTTPS provides, in block, only integrity, authenticity 
and confidentiality and does not offer the possibility to choose 
which properties to use depending on the available resources 
(i.e. the computational power of the device), the remaining 
battery or the data's sensitivity. As a result, HTTPS cannot be 
proposed as a suitable solution for secured mobile 
communications. 
In [2], we have proposed a solution called LECCSAM 
(Low Energy Consuming and Component based Security 
Architecture for Mobiles) that allows end-users to specify the 
security properties that they would like to see applied on their 
data when using HTTPS. Actually, thanks to LECCSAM a 
security property-based HTTPS has been proposed to provide a 
flexible HTTPS that adapts to users’ needs. The main goal of 
LECCSAM is to secure users’ data, exchanged between a 
smartphone and a server or another smartphone, by applying 
five security properties: integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, 
non-repudiation and access control thanks to eponymous 
security components.  
A detailed description of LECCSAM architecture and the 
main components (including the following security properties: 
integrity, confidentiality and authenticity) has been presented 
in [2]. In this paper, we focus on the fourth security component 
i.e. non-repudiation component and more specifically on its 
design, implementation and use. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section II and section 
III, we briefly define the non-repudiation property and present 
the existing non-repudiation protocols. In section IV, we give 
an overview on LECCSAM. In sections V and VI, we focus on 
the description of the design and implementation of the non-
repudiation component. In section VII, we show some results 
of the performance evaluation. Finally, in section VIII, we 
conclude this paper and propose future works.  
II. NON-REPUDIATION PROPERTY 
Non-repudiation guarantees that a party cannot deny having 
received/sent the message. Even, if it is not the most used 
security property, it can come in handy for scenarios involving 
trust during sensitive exchanges. Different types of non-
repudiation have been proposed, depending on who (sender or 
recipient) is applying the non-repudiation mechanism. From 
the sender point of view, one would be willing to be sure that 
her/his message was received by the recipient (non-repudiation 
of receipt (NRR)) or her/his message was well sent to the 
recipient (non-repudiation of submission (NRS)) or her/his 
message has been delivered to the recipient (non-repudiation of 
delivery (NRD)). From the recipient point of view, one would 
be willing to be sure that the message she/he received has been 
sent by a genuine sender (non-repudiation of origin (NRO)). 
NRR is quite simple to implement because it only needs a 
nuncio (i.e. a particular document that attests the validity of the 
transaction). The nuncio is generated by the sender and 
transmitted to the recipient. In order to terminate the 
transaction, the recipient needs to send the nuncio back. 
  
The NRO is easy to implement too. This mechanism 
requires most of the time a digital signature in order to prove to 
the recipient that the sender is genuine. The digital signature 
can be done with traditional algorithms such as SHA [3] or 
MD5 [4].  
Things tend to be a little bit more complex for NRS as this kind 
of non-repudiation requires a Trusted Third Party (TTP) to 
allow a secure and trusted interaction between a recipient and a 
sender. A TTP must be trusted by both parties and act as a 
man-in-the-middle to share and store proofs like digital 
signatures or nuncios. We stated previously that a non-
repudiation of receipt (NRR) needs only a nuncio, but a TTP 
can also be used to ensure that the nuncio is not altered during 
the transmission.  
III. RELATED WORKS 
In this section, we present existing protocols implementing 
non-repudiation property. 
Even if non-repudiation is not the most commonly used 
security property, various works [5] have been conducted to 
provide efficient and reliable protocols that implement such a 
property. These non-repudiation (NR) protocols can be divided 
in five categories:  
• NR without TTP ([6] [7]). 
• NR with inline TTP, in which the TTP is involved in each 
message ([8], [9]). 
• NR with online TTP, in which the TTP is involved in each 
session (i.e. for several messages) ([10], [11]). 
• NR with offline TTP, in which the TTP is involved only if 
an incorrect behaviour is detected ([12], [13]). 
• NR with transparent TTP, in which the offline TTP  
produces evidence indistinguishable from the evidences of 
both sender and recipient ([14] [15]). 
As stated previously, non-repudiation without TTP can be 
easily performed between the sender and the recipient. This 
solution can have a lack of robustness if the sender or the 
recipient is not trustworthy. On the contrary, protocols with 
inline TTP offer robustness, but they come with a time-
consuming drawback due to three-way transmissions (sender 
→ TTP → recipient). Nevertheless, solutions with online TTP 
try to prevent this lack of performances by involving the third 
party only for session management, which is useful if more 
than one message is sent during a session. Finally, offline and 
transparent TTPs offer an optimistic approach that involves the 
third party only when a problem occurs. These mechanisms are 
efficient if most of the transactions are genuine and 
trustworthy.  Despite the number of proposed solutions, none 
of them is using HTTP as a communication protocol. 
Therefore, the aim of our work is to add the non-repudiation 
property to an alternative version of HTTPs provided thanks to 
the LECCSAM architecture, that is described below. 
IV. OVERVIEW OF LECCSAM 
LECCSAM is an architecture that allows securing any 
communication protocol by adding the required security 
properties. A proof of concept has been provided to secure 
HTPP and XMPP by designing an alternative version of 
HTTPS and XMPPS. LECCSAM allows an end-user through 
her/his mobile device to choose the security properties that 
she/he wants to see applied on her/his data when sent to 
another user or server. This architecture is composed of several 
modules that have been described in details in [2]. However, 
here is a summary of the main components (see “Fig. 1”): 
• The security components, where each component is an 
assembly of existing cryptographic tools that fulfils the 
eponymous security property.  In LECCSAM, five security 
components have been defined for each security property 
(integrity, confidentiality, authenticity, non-repudiation and 
access control). 
• The policy engine specifies the security properties required 
to ensure the security level requested by the end-user for 
her/his data exchange. 
• The manager is the main component of LECCSAM. Its 
role is to orchestrate the security components to secure the 
data exchange. According to the security properties 
specified by the policy engine, the manager loads the right 
security components and apply the eponymous security 
properties to the data.  
• The interceptor is a module based on port listeners that 
intercepts all HTTP requests, extracts data and sends it to 
the manager in order to be secured. These listeners are 
located on both mobile device and LECCSAM side. 
Fig. 1.  LECCSAM architecture and workflow 
 
In the next two sections, we focus on the description of the 
design and implentation of the non-repudiation component.  
V. NON-REPUDIATION COMPONENT 
In this section, we present the non-repudiation component 
that will be used in order to add the non-repudiation property to 
the alternative version of HTTPS. 
A. Design choices 
In order to design the non-repudiation component, we had 
to choose the suitable type of non-repudiation. As stated in 
section II, existing solutions offer both advantages and 
drawbacks. In our case, we have chosen the non-repudiation of 
delivery (NRD) as, from our point of view, it is the most 
appropriate version of non-repudiation. This type of non-
repudiation allows a sender to be sure that her/his message was 
sent. Because NRD needs a third party, we have chosen 
LECCSAM as a TTP. Concerning the type of TTP, we have 
decided to use LECCSAM as an inline TTP. Consequently, it 
will be involved in every message transmission. 
  
To be considered as trusted, LECCSAM needs to embed 
several things: symmetric/asymmetric key mechanisms, a 
logging mechanism and of course a non-repudiation 
component. The keys are used to ensure that the nuncio and the 
data are not altered while transmitted between the different 
entities. The logging mechanism is used to keep a track of all 
transmissions with non-repudiation policy. Finally, the non-
repudiation component embeds the necessary mechanisms to 
ensure the non-repudiation property. 
B. Non-repudiation workflow 
The non-repudiation mechanism is a succession of several 
steps described in “Fig. 2”. These steps are summarized below: 
• First, the sender (i.e. mobile device) generates a request 
R that contains the data and the security level (i.e. data 
sensitivity) that the user wants to apply to her/his data. 
• Then, the sender generates a nuncio and uses the 
symmetric key k1 that it shares with LECCSAM to 
encrypt the concatenation of the request and the nuncio 
{R || N}k1. The concatenated message is then sent to 
LECCSAM. 
• LECCSAM receives the message and the manager 
analyses the security sensitivity and ask the policy 
engine to determine which security properties (SP) to 
apply. The manager applies then the identified security 
properties to the data to be sent.  
• After that, LECCSAM sends back the modified data 
{R}ps  to the sender. 
• The sender analyses the received data. If it contains the 
non-repudiation property, it will wait for the nuncio's 
return for a certain time. In the meantime, it sends the 
modified data to the recipient (mobile device or server). 
• When the recipient receives the data, it asks LECCSAM 
to verify the security properties. To do so, the recipient 
sends the modified data {R}ps.  
• LECCSAM receives the data, analyses the security 
properties and check the security properties applied 
previously (exp. check the integrity if this property has 
been applied) or decrypt the data if the confidentiality 
property has been applied. 
• Then, LECCSAM encrypts the data with the symmetric 
key k2 that it shares with the recipient. After this 
operation, it sends the data {R}k2  back to the recipient. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Non-repudiation mechanism 
Finally, LECCSAM encrypts the sender's nuncio {N}k1 and 
sends it back to the sender. The sender decrypts then the 
nuncio with k1 in order to be sure that the data was properly 
delivered. 
C. Non-repudiation component 
This component embeds different types of cryptographic 
mechanisms. As shown in “Fig. 3”, the data D to send is 
encrypted with a symmetric key K. This key is created by a 
random secret key generator. Then, the data {D}K is produced. 
The second embedded cryptographic mechanism is an 
asymmetric mechanism. LECCSAM public key PK is used to 
encrypt the concatenation of the symmetric key K and the 
nuncio (K || N). Once this is over, the data {K || N}PK is 
produced. Finally, both generated data {D}k and{K || N}PK are 
concatenated and sent. 
 
  
Fig. 3.  Non-repudiation component 
D. Keys Exchange workflow 
Data exchanged between LECCSAM and mobile device (or 
server) are encrypted with AES standard [16]. In the first 
version of LECCSAM, we supposed that each entity (i.e. 
mobile/server and LECCSAM) had already secret keys. In the 
new version of LECCSAM, we decided to use Diffie-Hellman 
keys exchange [17] to generate secret keys for each entity. The 
key exchange between the mobile/server and LECCSAM is 
initiated before each communication session as a hacker can 
steal the secret key used for a previous communication. The 
following steps and “Fig. 4” describe this key exchange 
mechanism: 
Figure 4. Key exchange mechanism 
• The mobile device initiates a new session with 
LECCSAM by giving its UID, which is an SHA-1 
value. 
• LECCSAM generates 3 random parameters 'g', 'p' and 
'a'. It sends to LECCSAM 'g', 'p' and 'A' such as A =  ga 
modp  
• The mobile device chooses a random number 'b' after 
reception of  'g', 'p' and 'A'. 
• The mobile device sends to LECCSAM 'B' such as B =  
gb modp  
• LECCSAM receives 'B' and generates 'K' such as K =  
Ab modp  
  
• LECCSAM saves K and the UID and send K to the 
mobile device. 
E. Key exchange component 
We have created a component implemented locally (i.e. on 
both client and LECCSAM side) in order to perform the 
previous workflow. This mechanism is in charge of the 
transmission of 'g' and 'p' to each entity. As stated previously, 
these values are used by the mobile/server to generate the same 
secret key between LECCSAM and the mobile device/server. 
This key is used in order to encrypt communications between 
these two entities. “Fig. 5” describes the key exchange 
component. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Key exchange component 
F. Logging module 
This module is also implemented in both LECCSAM and 
mobile device/server side. It is used to reinforce non-
repudiation component by keeping a track of every sent or 
received requests while using the non-repudiation security 
property. This information is stored in a specific format that 
includes time and date, UID and nuncios. In case of conflict, 
one can uses this module to prove or revoke a transaction. 
VI. IMPLEMENTATION 
In this section, we focus on the implementation of the non-
repudiation security component.   
A. Non-repudiation component 
To implement the non-repudiation component, we have 
defined four classes: 
• SunJCEAssymetricCiphering, which is used to ensure 
asymmetric ciphering. The keys are created within 
LECCSAM side. 
• SCNonRepudiation, which ensures the non-repudiation 
property.  
• Base64, which is used to match the differences between 
Java J2SE and Android. 
• LECCSAM, which represents LECCSAM as a TTP. 
In order to schedule the non-repudiation operations of “Fig. 
3”, we have defined a new component called non-repudiation 
manager. This manager is embedded in LECCSAM side and 
its role is to: 
• Call the traditional manager to apply the non-
repudiation property on the data. 
• Retrieve and transmit the nuncio sent by the mobile 
device. 
• Log the requests and the corresponding nuncios in order 
to keep a trace of the transactions. 
B. Key exchange component 
We have implemented a key exchange component 
(KeyManagementEntity) for the mobile device and 
LECCSAM. Thanks to this component, LECCSAM is able to 
distribute 'g' and 'p' to each mobile device. These values are 
used to generate the same secret key between a mobile device 
and LECCSAM in order to encrypt the communications 
between the two entities. To implement this component, we 
have defined five classes: 
• IkeyManager, which is the entry interface used to call 
the key Manager. 
• KeyManager, which ensures the key management 
mechanism (exchange and storage of the keys). 
• KeyOp, which realises operations such as saving, 
creating or deleting a key. 
• DHLECCSAM, which generates 'g', 'p' and 'd' 
parameters necessary for Diffie-Hellman keys exchange 
and generates 'B' parameters. 
• DHCLIENT, which generates the secret key depending 
on the values sent by LECCSAM. 
C. Security components orchestration 
Usually, the non-repudiation property is applied in addition 
to other security properties. To apply non-repudiation, the 
policy engine selects one of the following security properties 
combinations (see TABLE I). 
TABLE I.  SECURITY PROPERTIES COMBINATIONS  
Security 
Properties 
Integrity 
Non-repudiation 
Integrity 
Confidentiality 
Non-repudiation 
Integrity 
Confidentiality 
Authenticity 
Non-repudiation 
Component  
order when  
Sending data 
SCNonRepudiation 
SCIntegrity 
SCConfidentiality 
SCNonRepudiation 
SCIntegrity 
SCCConfidentiality 
SCNonRepudiation 
SCAuthenticity 
Component  
order when 
Receiving data 
SCIntegrity 
SCNonRepudiation 
SCIntegrity 
SCNonRepudiation 
SCConfidentiality 
SCAuthenticity 
SCNonRepudiation 
SCConfidentiality 
D. HTTP transmission workflow 
In this section, we explain the workflow between a mobile 
device and LECCSAM when the non-repudiation property is 
requested in addition to integrity and confidentiality properties. 
Before sending a message, the user A's interceptor adds the 
types “datatype” and “sensitivity” to the HTTP request. The 
datatype depends on the context (student tests, medical records, 
etc.). The sensitivity is specified by the user thanks to a 
graphical interface. Once the request if forged, the interceptor 
sends it to LECCSAM: 
GET /exam.txt/?profID= 
c678832bf6f37e1c4e8c265b77e920bbe80cec97c94c64796ed6400504b08aeb9d3c
42b65c7296370ab2 HTTP /1.1  
datasensitivity:3  
connection:Keep-Alive 
accept-encoding:gzip, deflate  
datatype:exam  
.....  
c379d505c51280c623e738f2ff657b041cb8ea8671d46db2620731fl1qn151b8b7pf
Cf03a90f89e116m  
After reception by LECCSAM's interceptor, the manager 
extracts the data. It verifies its integrity and change the 
  
parameter “scintegrity:add” to “scintegrity:successfull” if the 
integrity is preserved. Then, it decrypts the data with the secret 
key exchanged at the beginning of the session. 
After this operation, the manager has the decrypted information 
and the nuncio. 
GET /exam.txt/?profID= LILI HTTP/1.1 
datasensitivity:3  
datatype:exam 
scintegrity:: successful 
…. 
My Message 
In order to determine the right security properties to use, 
the manager sends “datasensitivity” and “datatype” to the 
policy engine. In this example, the policy engine sends to the 
manager the rule “int_conf_NR” to indicate that it has to apply 
the integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. However, as 
the integrity has already been applied by the mobile device, the 
manager will only apply the confidentiality and non-
repudiation properties. After applying both properties, the 
manager sends the data to the interceptor of the mobile device, 
which in its turn sends the data to the mobile device of the user 
B.  
GET / exam.txt /?profID= DN2hhOSjtSS4D....  HTTP/1.1 
scintegrity:successful  
scproperty : int_conf_NR  
… 
Te206VMDJ6kCFT6brRX8SYXu5okRr6eI4lOOrhoQ9honbL6w... 
After receiving the data, the interceptor of the mobile 
device of the user B retrieves the security properties applied 
thanks to the field scproperty. If the security property used is 
the integrity, the interceptor checks the integrity of the message 
thanks to the embedded integrity component. If other security 
properties are specified in the field scproperty, the interceptor 
sends the data to LECCSAM in order to check the other 
security properties and/or decrypt the data. 
According to “int_conf_NR”, LECCSAM checks the 
security properties and retrieves the plaintext message. Once 
this is done, it encrypts the plaintext with the secret key shared 
with the mobile device of the user B and sends the data to this 
latter. 
GET /exam.txt/?profID= fb613078e8430eabe53e8... HTTP/1.1 
 scintegrity:add  
scproperty : int_conf_NR  
.....  
7014e4dfce0e0d31f19d28086c6cbe65cdb2V644ff/st89s5126lw... 
The mobile device of the user B receives the data and uses 
its private key to decrypt the message in order to retrieve the 
original message. 
GET /exam.txt/?profID= LILI HTTP/1.1 
... 
My Message  
 In the meantime, LECCSAM sends the nuncio to the 
mobile device of the user A in order to prove that the original 
message was delivered to the mobile device of the user B.  
VII. TESTS AND RESULTS 
In this section, we present the performance evaluations of 
LECCSAM and of the implementation of the alternative 
version of HTTPS, in terms of processing time and power-
consumption,. We first give an overview about the test 
environment and the scenarios we used to conduct the tests. 
The second and third sub-sections present the results we 
obtained while performing our tests. 
A. Test environment and scenarios  
We used Battery Snap and Traceview [18] to determine 
both resources and energy-consumption while 
sending/receiving data. Concerning the device, we used a 2011 
smartphone on Android 2.1 to perform the tests. Our solution 
was tested with the following scenarios: 
• HTTP with integrity and non-repudiation (1) 
• HTTP with integrity, confidentiality, authenticity (2) 
• HTTP with integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and 
non-repudiation (3) 
• Traditional HTTPS (integrity, authenticity and 
confidentiality) (4) 
B. Time-consumption comparisons 
In (1), we measured the time-consumption of a secure 
transaction between the mobile device and LECCSAM, where 
integrity and non-repudiation properties have been applied. . 
The overall time of the transaction was 7,58 s. It is quite long, 
but it is important to state that AES encryption/decryption 
processing takes at least 3 seconds. In (2), we did the same 
with all security properties except non-repudiation. The time-
consumption for this scenario (already used for the previous 
version of LECCSAM [2]) is 4,5 s per transaction. In (3), we 
used our new non-repudiation component with the previous 
configuration. In this case, the time-consumption was 8 s. 
Finally, we have evaluated the time-consumption of the 
traditional HTTPS that ensures integrity, confidentiality and 
authenticity (4). We obtained an overall time of 13 s. These 
results are explainable by the fact that 90% of the time was 
used to perform additional tasks such as Webview (a view that 
displays Web pages within an Android activity). The tasks 
were not related to HTTPS, but it was not possible to 
deactivate these tasks in order to enhance HTTPS 
performances. Fig. 6 presents the results we have obtained with 
the previous scenarios.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 
6. Time-consumption results in seconds 
As we can see, adding non-repudiation property increases 
the time of computation. This drawback is mostly due to the 
fact that non-repudiation needs additional operations (i.e. 
generation, encryption/decryption and transmission of the 
nuncio). 
  
C. Energy-consumption comparisons 
As stated previously, we used Battery Snap to perform our 
tests. Sadly, this tool shows only 10% of battery variation. In 
other words, it was not possible to determine exactly the cost of 
a single transaction. Thus, we have decided to calculate the 
necessary time to consume 10% of battery while using one of 
the previous scenarios. To do so, we have modified the 
program to send continuous transactions. For these tests, we 
have compared: 
• HTTP with integrity, confidentiality, authenticity with 
key exchange mechanism (A) 
• HTTP with integrity, confidentiality, authenticity 
without key exchange mechanism (B) 
• HTTP with integrity, confidentiality, authenticity and 
non-repudiation (C)  
• Traditional HTTPS (D) 
 
While using settings (A), it took 5,55 mins for the battery 
to drop from 100% to 90%. Moreover, it took 4 mns to the 
traditional HTTPS (D) to use the same amount of energy.  
Concerning our new implementation, we can say that the 
scenario (C) is quite energy-consuming. Indeed, it took only 3 
mns for the mobile to loose 10% of battery. This energy-
consumption is due to the fact that the communication session 
was continuously open while waiting for the nuncio's return. 
Thus, a comparison between tests (A) and (B) showed that the 
key exchange mechanism alone is not very energy-consuming. 
Fig. 7 presents our results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Energy-consumption results in minutes 
VIII. CONCLUSION  
In this paper, we have presented the design and 
implementation of a non-repudiation security component that 
provides the eponymous security property. Thanks to this 
component, our architecture LECCSAM can provide an 
alternative version of HTTPS with a non-repudiation property, 
in addition to the integrity, confidentiality and authenticity 
properties.  
Regarding the performance evaluations, our tests have 
shown that non-repudiation is quite consuming in terms of 
processing time and energy consumption. This is due mainly to 
the nuncio exchange and the cyphering mechanisms. 
Nevertheless, our implementation has shown that it is possible 
to add a non-repudiation property to HTTP in order to ensure 
that a message is delivered, which is not the case with the 
traditional HTTPS. 
IX. FUTURE WORKS 
 In future works, we will focus on the optimisation of our 
non-repudiation component by testing other kinds of non-
repudiation mechanisms (non-repudiation of receipt, non-
repudiation of submission, etc.) and Trusted Third Party 
(online, offline, etc.). 
As the test results have shown that the waiting time for the 
nuncio's return was responsible of the high energy-
consumption; it will be interesting to resolve this problem by 
adding a shorter session timer or a mechanism that will allow 
the session to pause while waiting for the nuncio. 
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